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Some Problems of Policy-Related 
Attitude Surveys — With Examples from 
the Davis-Sinnott Report 
C I A R A N M c C U L L A G H * 
University College, Cork 
Precis: This paper offers a criticism of some of the problems involved in policy-related attitude sur­
veys. It argues that the assumptions made in order to generate information useful to policy-makers are 
difficult to defend. The four particular assumptions examined concern the nature of the problem 
towards which people are presumed to have attitudes, the nature of attitudes themselves, the belief 
that attitude research is descriptive and finally the relationship between the nature of public opinion 
and the choice of a research methodology. The argument is illustrated with examples from the report 
by Davis and Sinnott (1979) on attitudes to the Northern Ireland problem. 
I I N T R O D U C T I O N 
T he difficulties involved in doing policy-related research have always presented an acute problem for sociologists and social psychologists 
,(Coleman, 1979, p . 683) . This has been particularly the case for social scient­
ists and researchers employed either directly or indirect ly by the state. I t has 
proved dif f icul t to contribute to the development of the discipline while 
simultaneously generating the k ind of informat ion considered o f relevance to 
pol icy makers. For example, the disregard of the work of many rural sociolo­
gists by mainstream sociology, and the apparent stagnation o f that branch of 
study, is evidence o f the problems of this situation and of its potential ly 
dangerous consequences (Newby, 1980). 
* Thanks are due to my colleagues A. McCashin, J . P. O'Carroll and J . P. Ruane for comments on 
earlier versions of this paper. The usual disclaimers apply. 
Sample survey methods, and i n particular atti tude surveys, derive some o f 
their importance and status i n the discipline f rom the solution which they 
offer to this problem (Coleman, 1979, pp . 694-696). Their use has allowed 
researchers to contr ibute to the development of sociology and social psych­
ology through the development and refinement o f survey techniques and 
at t i tude measures while at the same t ime contr ibut ing to the generation of 
in format ion which is felt to be useful to pol icy makers. (On the importance 
o f att i tude surveys and opinion polls i n the development o f empirical func-
tionalism see Baldamus, 1976. See (Etz ioni , 1967), on the uses o f attitude 
survey to governments.) Al though there is some dispute among its pract i t ion­
ers as to the exact u t i l i t y and influence which the data derived f rom atti tude 
surveys have on pol icy makers, all agree that i t does have some, (see Kle in , 
1976, also Hodder Williams, 1970, Shepard, 1975, Hewi t t , 1974). As a result 
this t rad i t ion of research is strongly entrenched and influential . 
One impor tant consequence o f this increased association o f social research 
and public pol icy is, according to Coleman (1976) "increased at tention, 
scrutiny and care concerning the correctness o f results". This has meant that 
much of the discussion about such research has focused on what might be 
called the technical problems o f particular pieces o f research. 1 The result o f 
this is that other more general problems w i t h such research have been 
relatively neglected. These problems are not just specific to particular pieces 
of att i tude research but are problems of the t radi t ion of at t i tudinal research 
as such. The object of this paper is to offer a cri t ical examination of these 
more general problems o f that t radi t ion. 
The major problem w i t h this k ind o f work is that the assumptions which 
must be made to generate the k i n d of informat ion on attitudes that could 
conceivably be useful to pol icy makers, are i n fact dif f icul t for a social 
researcher to defend. They are unduly simplistic and lack a secure theoretical 
basis. I t follows f rom this that work based on these assumptions w i l l be of 
l imi t ed or questionable value bo th to many scientists and to pol icy makers. 
I t could be argued, at this po in t , that the increased association between 
social research and pol icy need not imply that the findings o f such research 
have any influence on pol icy format ion . Indeed Sharpe (1978), for example, 
has suggested that policy-makers i n Bri ta in are less receptive to social science 
than is usually supposed. Arguably the influence that social science can have 
depends on whether the pol icy makers' involvement i n research reflects a 
commitment to action or an alternative to i t . I n the former case the discus­
sion o f the assumptions underlying such research is important . I n the latter 
case, where research is sponsored by the pol icy maker, either to legitimate 
1 For a typical example see the debate about the authoritarian personality study in Christie and 
Jahoda, 1954. 
inaction or to legitimate decisions already made, the discussion here is largely 
irrelevant. 
This discussion w i l l focus on four of the assumptions that are inherent i n 
this pol icy research t rad i t ion . The argument w i l l be made that these assump­
tions cannot be uncri t ical ly accepted. 
To illustrate the argument, examples w i l l be taken f rom a research report 
by Davis and Sinnott (1979) on the attitudes o f people in the Republic o f 
Ireland to the Nor thern Ireland problem. This report is very much in the 
t radi t ion o f policy-related atti tude research. I t is concerned, on one hand, 
w i t h rigorous scientific work and, on the other, w i t h collecting informat ion 
which w i l l have pol icy implications i n the sense of being useful i n the formu­
la t ion o f better or more effective policies or o f contr ibut ing to discussions 
about such policies (Davis and Sinnott , 1979, pp. 19-24). 
However, as this paper is concerned w i t h a t radi t ion o f research rather 
than just a specific example of research, i t means that at tention w i l l be given 
to the more technical aspects of their research only where i t is necessary to 
do so in order to sustain more general arguments. These technical aspects 
have already been dealt w i t h i n some detail i n other places (see for example, 
Baker et al. 1980; McKeown, 1980; Davis and Sinnott , 1980a). What is being 
examined here is not so much how this particular piece of research was done; 
what is being considered are the wider problems involved in work ing w i t h i n 
this t r a d i t i o n . 2 
I I T H E ASSUMPTIONS E X A M I N E D A N D CRITICISED 
The first assumption in this k ind o f research involves what Carrier and 
Kendall (1972, p . 218) have called the "consensus approach" t o social 
problems. I n order to provide the pol icy maker w i t h informat ion on the 
attitudes of the popula t ion on particular problems, i t has been necessary to 
assume that the nature of the problems about which , or towards which , 
people are presumed to have attitudes is unproblematic and available to , and 
shared by , all i n a society. I t is, therefore, imp l i c i t l y assumed that the popu­
la t ion , whose attitudes are being researched, share the same general perspec-
2 Attitude and opinion are used interchangeably in this paper. This can be justified on two grounds. 
The first is that this is in many cases the textbook convention. See for example, Klineberg (1954, pp. 
489-501) and Lazarsfeld (1973, p. 77). Indeed Blumer (1969, pp. 90-101) has criticised the failure 
of sociologists and social psychologists to effectively distinguish "attitude" from other concepts 
including that of "opinion". The second is the equally common practice of treating opinions as 
"indicators", "verbal expressions", or "specific manifestations" of attitudes. Here the difference 
between attitude and opinion is not one of kind but of degree. See, for example, Rokeach (1968, 
p. 125), Thurstone and Chauve (1929, p. 7), Lindesmith and Strauss (1956, p. 494) and Scott (1968, 
p. 205). 
tive on what the nature of the problems of a society is, and on the ways in 
which they are problems, as does the pol icy maker. Given this consensus i t is 
possible to measure people's attitudes to particular problems and to compare 
the dis t r ibut ion of these attitudes between different social levels i n the 
society. 
Davis and Sinnott 's work embodies this assumption. They assume that 
there is a commonly accepted view as to the k ind o f problem the Northern 
Ireland problem is — i.e., i t is the k i n d of problem which requires as a solution 
some particular form of pol i t ical ins t i tu t ion . As everyone is presumed to 
share this view, they can make a valid choice of a workable and acceptable 
solution from a l imi ted number of inst i tut ional solutions presented to them 
by the researchers. The researchers can then simply add up the choices of 
particular solutions and produce statements l ike "a large majority of people 
i n the Republic of Ireland (68 per cent) choose some form of uni ted I re land" 
as a solution (Davis and Sinnott , 1979, p . 141). 
There are t w o related difficulties and one practical consequence involved 
in accepting this assumption. The first d i f f icul ty is that the consensus on the 
nature of the problem is assumed but not demonstrated. There is a failure to 
examine the extent to which this consensus exists i n the society. As Carrier 
and Kendall pu t i t (1972, p . 219) "the use of a consensus approach glosses 
over the question of the extent to which there is consensus about the nature 
of our society's social problems . . . but i t must also invite the prior assump­
t ion that everybody agrees about what the social problems of our society 
are". 
The second di f f icul ty is the failure to examine the nature of any such 
consensus as might exist. The practical consequence in research terms is the 
uncri t ical use and acceptance of the official or establishment view of the 
parameters o f the particular problem under investigation. 
This again can be seen clearly i n Davis and Sinnott 's work . They neglect 
to establish whether what they consider to be the Nor thern Ireland problem 
is i n fact a view o f the problem which is shared by their respondents. They 
fail to establish what people's perceptions of the nature of the problem are 
before they examine what people's preferences i n the line of solutions are. 
This was not covered, for example, in their p i lo t research which was con­
cerned mainly w i t h the refinement of atti tude items and measures (Davis and 
Sinnott , 1979, pp. 22-23; Davis and Sinnott , 1980b, pp. 10-11; 20-21). So, in 
effect, the respondents were not asked for their o w n view of the problem, as 
the researchers wou ld claim is the case. They are, i n fact, asked for their 
attitudes to a list o f solutions to what the researchers' view of the problem 
is. A n d that is a different kettle of statistics. 
The authors' discussion of Brit ish withdrawal and the defeat of the I R A is 
a good example of this Davis and Sinnott , 1979, p . 29). These, they claim, are 
not solutions to the problem, rather they are means t o a solution. A n d so 
they are not offered to respondents i n the list o f possible solutions to the 
problem. But such a procedure fails to consider that for many people either, 
or bo th , of these options may represent solutions because for them the 
problem is not one o f pol i t ical inst i tutions, but simply the interruptions of 
normal l i fe , which can be produced by violence, be i t official or terrorist. 
The neutralisation of either source of violence may therefore constitute a 
solution to many people's "Nor thern Ireland prob lem" . 
I f the nature o f the problem is not dealt w i t h to any great extent, the 
nature o f the consensus about the problem, and how this consensus is arrived 
at, is to ta l ly neglected. The authors remain unconcerned about "how and 
why social problems came to be seen as such" (Carrier and Kendall , 1972, 
p. 223). Thus they ignore the large body of w o r k which suggests that the 
designation of a social phenomenon as a problem is seldom the result of 
social consensus, (see, for example, Becker, 1963; also Hartjen, 1977, pp. 35-
60). The social construction of a phenomenon or situation as a problem 
works through pol i t ical processes. What becomes seen as the problem is the 
result o f pol i t ical processes precipitated and influenced by those in a society 
who are most vocal, most influential and who have access to resources for 
disseminating opinions or influencing decisions. Such groups have the 
influence to set the problems about which the public w i l l be concerned and 
also to delineate the range of opinions that w i l l be available on these issues.3 
They can set the agenda as to what the issues in a society are and, i n Morris 
Janowitz's phrase, they can set the " l imi t s w i t h i n which public debate on 
controversial issues takes place" (quoted i n Gouldner, 1970, p . 300). I n this 
view the "consensus" about what the problems of a society are and public 
opinion and attitudes to these problems are the creation of pol i t ical act ivi ty. 
"The makers o f public po l i cy" , says Kle in (1976, p . 334), "are i n an active, 
not a passive relationship to public op in ion" . 
I f this view o f social problems and public opinion is correct, and we shall 
consider i t further when we examine the question o f the consistency and 
stability of attitudes, then the nature of atti tude and opinion research is 
fundamentally altered. Researchers in this t radi t ion are not measuring public 
attitudes or opinions in the way in which they claim. They are simply 
measuring how successful certain powerful interest groups have been in 
disseminating their views of these questions. Public opinion in this sense is 
" l i t t l e more than a reflection o f what those having the abi l i ty to employ the 
media for their own benefit want the public to believe" (Hartjen, 1977, 
3 Interestingly, concern has recently been expressed in the United States that the way in which the 
press presents the results of opinion polls may be a factor in influencing, or indeed in helping to 
create, people's perceptions of political issues. See Gollin, (1980, pp. 450-457) for a discussion of this 
and for references to the relevant literature. 
p. 55) . 
A second assumption in this k i n d o f research relates to the nature of 
attitudes. I t is impl ic i t i n the idea o f atti tude research for pol icy purposes 
that a pol icy which takes account of these attitudes is more l ikely to be 
successful than one which does not . I n other words, i t tends to be assumed 
that i f people's attitudes are not taken note of, they w i l l result in conse­
quences which are felt to be undesirable from the policy-makers viewpoint . 
Thus the social scientist contributes to better pol icy making by uncovering 
for the pol icy makers the content of people's attitudes. 
However, there is a problem in all this. I f people's attitudes are to assume 
such importance in pol icy making or i f they are to become the base from 
which pol icy recommendations are made, then i t is necessary to assume that 
such attitudes are both consistent and releatively enduring (Shaw 1976; Piatt 
1971 , pp. 34-36). I f attitudes are inconsistent, i t wou ld be diff icul t to 
formulate policies which wou ld accommodate themselves to these attitudes. 
I f attitudes are constantly changing, i t wou ld be impractical to change 
policies often enough to keep in line w i t h changes in attitudes. 
This assumption is one which is easily made by atti tude researchers but i t 
is one which is very di f f icul t to just i fy and to sustain. On the question of 
the consistency of attitudes there is i n fact a range of literature available 
which stresses the inconsistencies i n the clusters o f attitudes held by people 
(for example, Converse, 1964; Converse and Duplex, 1966; Davis, H . , 1979; 
Ladd, 1980) . 4 A m o n g this cluster o f attitudes, Converse (1964, p. 213) 
remarks that " l i t t l e constraint is felt, even quite often in instances of sheer 
logical constraint". Mer ton (1940, p . 26) supports this view when he says 
that "tests of consistency imply that respondents never hold inconsistent 
opinions or at t i tudes" and " i n making this assumption the investigator is 
using the norms of logic, not the facts of sociology". 
I t is w o r t h pursuing the question of why people are expected to have 
stable and consistent attitudes. Arguably, i t is assumed that because particular 
events and issues are impor tant for pol i t ical and social elites in society, they 
should also be impor tant to other people i n the society. Indeed i t is "a 
common elite assumption that all or a significant majority of the public con­
ceptualised the main lines of politics after the manner of the most highly 
educated" (Converse 1964, p . 218). Thus the centrality of such issues in 
peoples lives should place the constraint of logical consistency on the att i­
tudes which they ho ld . 
However, many of the issues about which people are asked their attitudes 
are issues that often do not appear to be central to their lives and are not 
4 These views have of course generated their own critics. For a recent example, see Judd and Milbum 
(1980) and also Converse (1980) for his most recent reply to these critics. 
issues about which people have either much direct personal knowledge or 
experience (Klein 1976, p . 325; Bogart, 1967). I f , for example, the interest 
o f people can be used as a measure of the centrality of the issue for 
them, then there are grounds to doubt the centrali ty o f the Nor thern Ireland 
problem to people in the South of Ireland. Over half o f the sample (52 per 
cent) are only "sl ightly interested or less so" i n this problem (Davis and 
Sinnott 1979, p . 37) . I f such issues are o f such a peripheral nature to people 
then, presumably, the constraint of logical consistency is correspondingly 
reduced. A n d , as Converse and Duplex (1964) have argued, opinion forma­
t i o n i n any real sense appears to decline as issues and events become more 
remote f rom the particular individuals or groups involved. 
When people are asked to talk about or give attitudes and opinions on 
questions and issues that are outside their normal range o f experience 
they do not appear to be inhibi ted by their lack of knowledge or experience 
or indeed o f opinions. Research shows that there are appreciable amounts of 
uninformed answering i n atti tude surveys, though the exact size o f this is a 
matter of some dispute (see the discussion in Schuman and Presser, 1980). 
Instead, as Davis (1979, p . 194) argues, to the degree to which issues do 
not present themselves as part o f people's experiences, then their attitudes 
are much more l ike ly to be externally derived, derived that is f rom the 
opinion forming and consciousness creating insti tutions i n the society. 
As Kle in (1976, p . 332) says, "the level o f informat ion about most pol i t ical 
issues is very l o w indeed and hence the dependence on the views o f figures 
carrying author i ty tends to be correspondingly h igh" . I n order to produce 
attitudes on such issues people fall back on , or make use of, publically pur­
veyed ideology as they understand and perceive i t . Their attitudes and 
opinions can therefore be said to constitute externally mediated perspectives. 
A n y blurr ing or inconsistencies i n these opinions and attitudes are due 
simply to the imperfect absorption o f the publically available ideology. 
I f many sociologists have reasons to be sceptical about the consistency o f 
attitudes, they wou ld also tend to agree w i t h Deutscher (1973, p . 11) 
when he says that "there is no evidence that att i tude or opinion remain 
stable through t ime or under changing circumstances" (see also Butler and 
Stokes, 1969, pp. 176-182). Indeed there are few reasons offered in the 
relevant literature as to why attitudes should be stable apart f rom the inclu­
sion o f the cri ter ion of stability i n the defini t ion o f an att i tude (for an 
example o f this see Rokeach 1968, p . 112). 
Many sociologists, therefore, wou ld not anticipate that measured attitudes 
in the general populat ion wou ld be either consistent or enduring (see, for 
example, Edelman, 1971 , pp. 3-12). The Davis-Sinnott research wou ld 
simply provide them w i t h further evidence for this view. Though the authors 
claim (1979, p . 19, p . 141) that the attitudes measured in their research are 
bo th consistent and enduring, this assertion is one which they have some 
di f f icu l ty i n maintaining. The consistency o f the attitudes is contradicted by 
many o f their own findings while their enduring nature is asserted but no 
supporting evidence is provided and this view is later contradicted and 
indeed wi thdrawn by the authors themselves. 
Take the alleged consistency o f attitudes first. Consider some o f these 
findings. O f those people who feel that a Uni ted Ireland is the most practical 
and acceptable solution to the Nor thern Ireland problem, 30 per cent feel 
the government should stop ta lking about the goal of un i ty ( ib id . p . 64) . 
Seventeen per cent o f people who choose a Uni ted Ireland do not expect the 
border ever to disappear ( ib id . p . 50) . Seventy per cent of respondents th ink 
the government should draft a new const i tut ion to assist i n bringing about a 
solution, but this const i tut ion should not drop the claim to Nor thern Ireland 
and i t should not al low divorce ( ib id . p . 66) . So they want a new const i tut ion 
which w o u l d retain the t w o major items which have provoked public discus­
sion of the need for such a new const i tut ion. A m o n g those endorsing a 
cont inuat ion of the l i n k between Great Bri ta in and Northern Ireland, 46 
per cent favour unilateral Brit ish withdrawal ( ib id . p . 71). Sixty-six per cent 
of Catholics i n Nor thern Ireland th ink the constitutional claim to Northern 
Ireland should be retained in the Irish const i tut ion yet only 39 per cent of 
Catholics there favour a Uni ted Ireland ( ib id . p . 84 and p . 61) . Final ly, 64 per 
cent of respondents favour a pol icy of pressuring the Brit ish to wi thdraw, 
while 78 per cent argue that the government should insist that the Brit ish 
implement powersharing ( ib id . p . 70) . So at least 40 per cent of respondents 
want the Brit ish to get out , bu t also to stay. 
I f the authors' findings tend to undermine their view on the consistency 
o f attitudes, their view on the endurance of attitudes is contradicted by 
many o f their own comments. The normal meaning of enduring is long-
lasting and the authors are prepared, in the early stages of their report, to 
assert that attitudes are stable and enduring ( ib id . p . 19). However, as the 
report proceeds they come to realise that attitudes tend to be influenced 
and changed by social and temporal contexts ( ib id . p . 101 and p. 150). This 
realisation paves the way for eventual strategic withdrawal from the original 
posi t ion. I n their subsequent reply to one set o f their critics, we f ind that 
they "agree that attitudes may change over t i m e " (Davis and Sinnott 1980b, 
p . 38) . They do not , however, provide us w i t h any data which wou ld allow 
us to choose between their different views. As is typical i n much atti tude 
research, all of the data are collected at a single poin t i n t ime. Thus their 
sets o f beliefs regarding the endurance o f attitudes cannot be put to any 
empirical test. 
There is, therefore, l i t t l e i n this report which wou ld cause the revision of 
the view that the measured attitudes are not necessarily consistent or endur-
ing. I t also follows that i f attitudes do not have these qualities then know­
ledge o f them is not necessarily an indispensable asset for the pol icy maker. 
Indeed, i t wou ld suggest that the pol icy maker could experience considerable 
d i f f icul ty i n t ry ing to design policies to accommodate to , or to take in to 
account, the measured attitudes o f the general populat ion. 
The th i rd assumption underlying this k i n d of work is the belief that 
atti tude research is basically descriptive w o r k . A t t i t ude researchers simply 
collect the facts and then allow the facts to speak for themselves. They have 
access to , and command over, neutral scientific techniques which allow them 
access to public attitudes and which allow them to reproduce accurately the 
current state o f such attitudes. Indeed, i t is the presumed value-neutrality 
of survey techniques which gives, to opinion polls and to att i tude surveys, 
the author i ty of science. I t is this authori ty which allows the results o f such 
surveys to be used to claim precedence over statements of interest groups as 
the major indicator of the state of public opinion (for a discussion of this, 
see Plowman, 1962). 
However, survey techniques are not quite as neutral as they appear. Their 
use gives rise to major problems, though these are not problems of descrip­
t ion but o f interpretat ion. I t is simply not the case that facts speak for them­
selves. No set o f survey data describes itself. The story which i t tells is 
crucially affected by the interpretations and expectations o f the researchers. 
Again, the Davis-Sinnott report provides evidence for these contentions. 
They quite clearly share the belief i n the descriptive nature o f attitude 
research. The sub-title of their report, for example, describes i t as a descrip­
tive analysis. However, the problems of interpretation involved in "describing" 
data can be seen very clearly when they discuss the factor analysis of their 
at t i tudinal items. 
There are no definitive rules i n social research about the interpretation of 
the results of factor analysis. This is particularly so in considering the number 
o f factors to be extracted and also i n deciding whether particular items form 
part o f a factor or not . I n the latter case, some researchers use a factor load­
ing of > . 3 0 as a decision rule while others take cut-off points as high as >.60 
(see Chi ld , 1970, pp. 43-50). The impor tant po in t is that the decision as to 
which level to work at depends part ly on what the researcher's hypotheses 
are. He chooses the level which he considers most appropriate to his research 
problem. 
The d i f f icu l ty here, however, is that hypotheses belong to domain of 
explanatory research. But the authors constantly claim, as is usual for atti tude 
researchers, that they are engaged in descriptive and not explanatory 
research. So how then do they interpret their factor analysis? One can, i n 
fact, only infer this f rom an examination of their analysis. 
The criteria they work w i t h appear to have been the desire to f ind what 
they already anticipated wou ld exist, namely, clear-cut, relatively indepen­
dent and separable attitudes to par t i t ion , "Protestant" politics and the I R A 
(Davis and Sinnott , 1979, pp. 94-101). They, therefore, w o r k w i t h a factor 
loading o f > . 4 0 , which produces for them these three separate and coherent 
att i tude sets. They then further assume that one o f these sets, that o f at t i ­
tudes to the I R A , is, i n fact, composed o f t w o different sets of attitudes, 
one to the motives o f the I R A and the other to the means which the 
I R A use. Working w i t h a higher cut-off po in t , a factor loading of > . 6 0 , the 
factor analysis produces these t w o sets of data. 
The authors seem under the impression, i n their original report, that this 
use o f factor analysis is a neutral and descriptive act ivi ty. They seem un­
aware o f the implications o f the fact that as the choice of cut-off points is 
part ly a matter of subjective judgement the coherence of the factors produced 
is also par t ly a matter of subjective judgement and no t entirely an artefact of 
the method of analysis. As such this element of subjective judgement and 
interpretat ion is an intrinsic part of all data analysis. 
I n their recently published reply to the critics o f the original report the 
authors show an awareness of this subjective element i n data analysis when 
they say that "no methodology allows one to dispense w i t h the judgement 
of the researcher" (Davis and Sinnot, 1980b, p . 42) . I t is i n these terms that 
they jus t i fy the apparently arbitrary use o f cut-off points described above. 
This, however, bo th gains the poin t and loses i t at the same t ime. I t is true 
that the choice of cut-off points is part ly a matter of subjective judgement. 
The po in t , however, is that, once chosen, i t is incumbent on the researcher 
to use the particular decision rule i n a consistent fashion. Formal criteria i n 
this sense bo th acknowledge the role of the researcher's judgement in the 
choice of a decision rule but also act to l i m i t the play of personal judgement. 
There is an inevitable element of subjectivism in the choice of such criteria 
but this subjectivism is controlled by adherence to the chosen criteria. 
Failure to do so creates the k ind of situation discussed by Davis (1970, p . 
91) where "the reader wonders exactly what sort of evidence i t would take 
to 'disconfirm' the (particular) hypothesis". 
This k ind o f discussion helps to make an impor tant poin t about the find­
ings of att i tude surveys. These findings are not simply the product of a value-
neutral scientific process of data collection and analysis but of a process of 
analysis in which the researcher's interpretations and subjective judgements 
play a crucial role. This tends to be ignored by atti tude researchers either 
because they are unaware of i t or because i t undermines the claims to 
author i ty which their surveys often make. The major po in t , however, is that, 
despite what atti tude researchers may claim, the facts do not speak for them­
selves, researchers play a part i n giving the facts a tone of voice. The greater 
realisation by pol icy makers that this is the case might dilute their enthusiasm 
for such surveys. 
A n d , f inal ly, there is a four th assumption underlying this k ind o f research. 
This concerns the view of the nature of public opinion w i t h which such 
researchers work . Al though this has been considered earlier, I wish here to 
concentrate on the relationship between their view of the nature o f public 
opinion and their choice of a researcher methodology. Public opinion tends 
to be defined operationally in this t radi t ion (Shepard 1975, p . 5) . The belief 
is that to research public opinion, to f ind out what public attitudes are, you 
simply interview a random sample of the public, add their responses together 
and the overall result is a measure of public opinion. Public opinion and 
public attitudes are simply the aggregation of the views of discrete individuals. 
Such views are generally untheorised in the work o f att i tude researchers. 
However, they are impl ic i t i n their methodologies and especially in their 
sampling techniques in which every individual i n a society is presumed to be 
of equal significance and to carry equal weight. As Shepard ( ib id . p . 6 ) , says, 
they have "adopted the egalitarian-democratic principle of 'one man, one 
vote, one value' and have amended i t to read 'one man, one opinion, one 
value'". However, despite the appeal of such ideas, they are, to m y mind , 
basically untenable. 
I n criticising this assumption, I fo l low closely the argument of Blumer 
(1969, pp. 195-208). He claims that to realistically study public opinion 
we must be fai thful to its empirical character. I n this he is simply stating 
a basic methodological principle which suggests that a defini t ion of the 
phenomenon under study should be established independently of the choice 
of a research technique w i t h which to study i t . I n other words we know 
what public opinion is before we research i t . 
What then is the empirical character of public opinion? Public opinion is 
what the words suggest, the public expression of opinion. Such is the nature 
of our society that the opinions which are expressed in public forums tend 
to be the opinions o f organised groups in the society like trade unions, 
employers groups, pol i t ical parties and other interest groups. Leaders and 
officials o f such groups take positions on their behalf and publ ic ly state and 
argue for these positions. This probably accounts for the high degree o f con­
sistency found in the attitudes and opinions o f members of the elite compared 
to members of the mass public. 
The expression o f these opinions, i n the form of speeches, letters, peti­
t ions, delegations and so on, is for the very specific purpose of influencing 
the actions o f pol i t ical decision makers i n society. However, given the variety 
and confl ict ing interests of such organised groups, their range o f opinions 
w i l l be correspondingly diverse and confl ict ing. So, as Blumer ( ib id . p . 201) 
concludes, " i n any realistic sense public opinion consists of the pattern of 
the diverse views and positions on the issue that come to the individuals who 
have to act i n response to the public op in ion" , "the character of public 
opinion . . . must be sought i n the array of views and positions which enter 
in to the consideration of those who have to take action on public op in ion" . 
A number of points fo l low from this delineation of the character on 
public opinion. One is that i n no sense does the expression of a group view 
imp ly that this view is held equally by all members of the group concerned. 
As Blumer ( ib id , p . 200) points out some may subscribe to the view wi thou t 
actually understanding i t , some may be indifferent to i t , while some may 
simply not share i t bu t may not wish to publ ic ly disagree w i t h the group's 
spokesman. This does not prevent the view being introduced in to public 
discussion as the collective view of the group. A second point , which follows 
from this, is about the people who act on public opinion. They f ind that 
public opinion comes to them i n the form of diverse and usually opposed 
views so i f they wish to be responsive to such views they must assess their 
respective value. This assessment, not surprising, is influenced by the power 
and prestige of the group expressing the opinion or i n Blumer's words ( ib id , 
p . 202) " i n this assessment consideration is given to expressions only to the 
extend to which they are judged to coun t " (see also Windesham, quoted i n 
R. Shepard, 1975, p . 6; and Crespi, 1980). The result of this is that the 
opinions o f those in structurally important positions are of far more con­
sequence than those of the majori ty . 
The implications of these points for the study of public opinion and 
attitudes are that a research method which gives equal weight and equal 
significance to the opinion of each individual i n the society is not adequate 
to the empirical character o f the phenomenon i t claims to study. The views 
of organised groups are not simply the quantitative summation of the views 
of their individual members. Neither do these individuals carry equal weight 
i n the format ion and expression of public opinion. I n this case, as i n many 
others, the individual is only in a very l imi ted sense a sociologically significant 
un i t . Or as Gouldsbolm (1977, p . 79) puts i t , "at t i tude studies often do not 
take in to consideration factors such as power than tend to structure social 
action. For most kinds of social action, everyone does not have an equal 
vo te" (see also Galtung 1967, pp. 150-152). I t follows f rom this that atti tude 
surveys, which in their choice of a research method, attr ibute such signifi­
cance to individuals are unsuitable to the study of public attitudes and 
public opinions. 
S U M M A R Y A N D CONCLUSION 
This review has taken four of the assumptions which underpin and often 
jus t i fy the study of public opinions and public attitudes to matters of 
pol i t ical and social pol icy . I n showing that these assumptions are untenable, 
the claim is being made that such research cannot really claim to be of value 
to policy-makers and i t is inadequate as sociology or as good social research. 
I t leads to an over-ready acceptance of official definitions o f problems and • i , . 
so ignores the pol i t ical processes through which such definitions are created 
and disseminated. I t distorts the nature of attitudes by ascribing logic 
criteria of consistency and endurance to them, rather than sociological ones. 
I t has a simplistic att i tude to research techniques, seeing them as neutral 
technical devices rather than as techniques which embody in their use 
subjective and often arbitrary decisions by those who use them. Finally, i t 
works w i t h a view of society and of public opinion which is overly sim­
plistic and which has l i t t l e theoretical support. 
I n the long te rm, such w o r k has l i t t l e part to play in the development of 
sociology in Ireland, or anywhere else for that matter. The t ime has come to 
make a decisive break w i t h this t radi t ion and to embody in the k i n d of 
research which gets wide coverage, the high levels of the crit ical sophistica­
t i o n which exist i n Irish sociology. Such a move need not involve any 
reduction i n willingness to do pol icy research, just greater discretion in the 
way in which this research is done. I f the evidence of other countries is any­
thing to go by, this latter k i n d o f pol icy research w i l l hot be l iked by pol icy 
makers. Some o f the research stimulated by the Communi ty Development 
Projects i n Br i ta in is adequate i l lustrat ion o f this. However, this should not 
constitute a deterrent. I t is better that the development of sociology in 
Ireland rests w i t h the theoretical innovativeness o f its practitioners than in 
the passing enthusiasms o f pol icy makers. 
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